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Investigating the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is a fundamental topic 
in political science. The representation of ethnic minorities’ interests, their political 
participation, and trust in democratic institutions, hinges on minorities’ adequate 
numerical (or descriptive) representation in decision-making assemblies (Mansbridge, 
1999). Since proportional representation (PR) systems perform better than single-
member district (SMD) systems in producing proportionality between parties’ vote and 
seat shares, they are often said to be more conducive to minority representation (Ruedin, 
2009). However, scholarship demonstrates that the distinction between the two types of 
systems is not clear-cut. A key factor to be considered is the settlement patterns of 
minorities. That is, SMD systems can be more beneficial to geographically concentrated 
minorities than closed-list PR systems, while geographically dispersed minorities may 
find it easier to access the parliamentary ranks through closed-list PR systems 
(Bloemraad, 2013; Bochsler, 2011; Dancygier, 2014; Ruedin, 2009).  
Evidence favouring the moderating effect of minorities’ geographical 
concentrations is also provided by studies conducted in mixed-member (MM) systems 
(Donovan, 2007; Friedman, 2005; Kostadinova, 2007; Moser, 2008; Schönwälder, 
2012; Wüst, 2014; Zollinger and Bochsler, 2012). Since MM systems create 
parliaments with a fixed share of seats elected under SMD and remaining seats allocated 
by PR (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003), this line of research mainly seeks to make 
‘controlled’ comparisons between levels of minority representation in the (closed-list) 
PR and in the SMD tier.  
However, extant research in MM systems considers the geographical representation 
of minorities as a decisive factor in the SMD tier, while surprisingly little is known 
about the consequences of minorities’ settlement patterns in the closed-list PR tier of 
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MM systems. Consequently, we ask in this paper whether minorities’ geographical 
concentration influences descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM 
systems.1 Pursuing this question provides an interesting research puzzle. From the 
perspective of formal electoral rules, minorities’ geographical concentration may not be 
consequential in the PR tier because closed-list PR electoral rules lack the kind of 
geographical representation institutionalised in SMD systems (Latner and McGann, 
2005). Conversely, minorities’ geographical concentration could be a decisive factor for 
their descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems due to 
contamination effects between the two electoral tiers or due to informal recruitment 
rules requiring candidates to possess and maintain involvement in local politics. If 
candidates have such local attachments when running in the PR tier of MM systems, 
parties may have incentives to allocate promising list positions to minority candidates 
who are rooted in the geographical areas where minorities concentrate.  
This article, we believe, is the first to pursue this research question. Moreover, by 
outlining a novel theoretical understanding of minorities’ geographical representation, 
we make a theoretical contribution to the literature. Empirically, we provide a case 
study of list placements of dual candidates of immigrant origin running in the 18th 
German Bundestag elections held in 2013. Implemented in 1949, the German MM 
system has been in place continuously since then and is, therefore, the oldest existing 
MM system, which has, as a prototype, inspired other MM system designs globally in 
their basic, although not necessarily in all, features (Manow, 2015: 1–8). As such, the 
German electoral system may provide insights relevant for minority representation in 
other MM and closed-list PR systems, or for constitutional designers who plan to 
implement a German-style system.  
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Empirical results provide evidence that the list positions of dual candidates of 
immigrant-origin are positively related to geographical concentrations of immigrant-
origin residents. This suggests that, in addition to formal electoral rules, other factors 
can affect geographical patterns of minority representation. Thus, our knowledge about 
the interplay of electoral rules, minorities’ geographical representation, and their 
descriptive representation is far from complete, urging future research to investigate 
other determinants of local minority representation than formal electoral rules.  
Electoral rules and the link between minorities’ local concentration and their 
descriptive representation 
The geographical representation of ethnic minorities is widely considered to be an 
important feature of SMD electoral rules for two main reasons. First, when the electoral 
territory is carved up into several SMDs, geographically concentrated minorities can 
become electorally powerful in a number of districts (or even the local majority) so that 
minority candidates are more likely to be electorally successful in these districts 
(Bochsler, 2010, 2011; Dancygier, 2014; Trounstine and Valdini, 2008: 555). Second, 
minorities’ geographical concentration is also supposed to strengthen minority 
candidates’ grassroots support within parties (Dancygier, 2014; Garbaye, 2000: 300; 
Laurence and Maxwell, 2012: 27). Dense networks of ethnic associations foster 
minorities’ political participation and increase their local power resources at the 
grassroots level (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Thus, minorities have greater opportunities 
to request that local party selectorates choose a local minority politician as a candidate 
in the upcoming district election (Dancygier, 2014: 236; Garbaye, 2000; Laurence and 
Maxwell, 2012: 21–29; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 143–165). However, if minorities 
are geographically dispersed under SMD electoral rules, then minorities may lose their 
local voting power and minority aspirants cannot rely on similar levels of local 
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grassroots support (Bochsler, 2010, 2011; Dancygier, 2014; Trounstine and Valdini, 
2008). In other words, previous work suggests that the consequences of SMD electoral 
rules are contingent on minorities’ geographical concentration. 
In a similar vein, empirical research in MM systems mainly considers minorities’ 
geographical concentration to be a decisive factor for descriptive representation in the 
SMD tier. Existing research in Eastern European MM systems suggests that, due to 
minorities’ geographical concentration, the SMD tier provides often for similar or even 
better levels of minorities’ descriptive representation compared to the PR tier 
(Friedman, 2005; Kostadinova, 2007). Other works suggest that the SMD tier may often 
be more conducive to minorities’ descriptive representation since smaller districts are 
more likely to be ethnically homogenous, thus giving minorities more leverage to elect 
group members (Moser, 2008; Zollinger and Bochsler, 2012). Similarly, analysts of 
immigrant-minority representation in Germany ascribe lower levels of descriptive 
representation in the SMD tier to a pattern of modest geographical concentrations of 
immigrant groups (Donovan, 2007: 473; Schönwälder, 2012: 70–74). 
Under closed-list PR electoral rules, whether in the PR tier of MM systems or in 
‘pure’ PR systems, minorities’ geographical concentration is not typically considered a 
driver of their descriptive representation. That may be because closed-list PR rules are 
typically envisioned to provide little leverage for geographical representation patterns 
(Latner and McGann, 2005). Moreover, closed-list PR rules are commonly thought to 
differ from SMD rules in that they put the electoral fate of minority candidates in the 
hands of national party elites rather than in those of local minority voters and/or 
activists. Regardless of minorities’ settlement patterns, party elites are assumed to 
follow strategies of ticket-balancing reflecting the sociodemographic outlook of the 
overall electorate for the purpose of garnering votes from minority voters and to avoid 
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negative publicity about a potentially undiversified party list (Dancygier, 2014: 328; 
Laurence and Maxwell, 2012: 15–20; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 195; Valdini, 2012: 
741; Zollinger and Bochsler, 2012: 615). Accordingly, there may be no relationship 
between the list position of minority candidates in the PR tier of a MM system and the 
local concentration of minority groups. Thus, it is not surprising that there is, as far as 
we know, a lack of research on the impact of the geographical concentration of ethnic 
minorities on their descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems 
as well as in closed-list PR systems.  
Minorities’ geographical representation in the PR tier of MM systems 
Minorities’ geographical concentration and their descriptive representation in the 
closed-list PR tier of MM systems may be more strongly related with each other than 
previous scholarship on minority representation in MM systems suggests. First, 
candidates in the PR tier may be locally connected due to contamination effects between 
the SMD and the PR tier. Indeed, literature largely unrecognised by scholarship on 
minority representation in MM systems suggests that the existence of two electoral tiers 
provides parties, candidates, and voters with new avenues for strategic behaviour. 
Bochsler, for example, demonstrates that, in compensatory MM systems, larger parties 
can make (illegitimate) deals with other parties and voters for the purpose of bypassing 
the compensatory mechanism and increasing their overall seat shares (Bochsler, 2012). 
Since the pioneering work of Herron and Nishikawa (2001), proponents of cross-tier 
contamination argue similarly that the behaviour of parties and voters differs strongly in 
MM systems from that of parties and voters in ‘pure’ SMD or PR systems.  
Contamination posits that voters reward parties with PR votes in response to the 
personal appeal of SMD candidates; that is, personal votes cast in the SMD tier spill 
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over into votes for the party in the PR tier (Ferrara et al., 2005: 65–79; Hainmueller and 
Kern, 2008; Herron and Nishikawa, 2001; Manow, 2015: 61–85). Consequently, parties 
have vote-seeking incentives to nominate candidates to as many SMD districts as 
possible, even if they have no chance of winning the SMD race (Ferrara et al., 2005: 37; 
Herron and Nishikawa, 2001: 69–70). For this reason, it is common practice to 
nominate candidates in SMDs and in party lists simultaneously, so-called dual 
candidates2 (Crisp, 2007; Ferrara et al., 2005; Hennl, 2014; Hennl and Kaiser, 2008; 
Manow, 2015: 161). In many MM systems, parties typically maximise their numbers of 
dual candidates by making the selection of candidates in the SMD tier a requirement for 
realistic list positions in the PR tier (Manow, 2015: 161). As local selection in the SMD 
tier is often considered a pre-condition for selection in realistic list positions in the 
closed-list PR tier, most viable list candidates may, therefore, be locally connected.  
Second, party list candidates could be locally rooted due to informal recruitment 
requirements to maintain connections to local politics. In many closed-list PR and MM 
systems, political aspirants are required to gather political experience in local 
government, councils and/or party organisations before they are considered viable party 
list candidates. Even as elected legislators, they often keep their local mandates and 
offices in addition to their seats in the national parliament, thus effectively maintaining 
local political attachments. Evidence of such requirements is reported for many closed 
list systems, for instance, in Germany (Wessels, 1997), Israel (Hazan, 1999), Italy 
(Russo, 2011), the Netherlands (Leijenaar and Niemöller, 1997), and Portugal 
(Fernandes et al., 2017). For this reason, it is plausible to assume that grassroots support 
from local concentrations of ethnic minorities is often an inherent part of legislative 
recruitment in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems. Grassroots support ensures 
candidates’ local selection in SMDs (if contamination is the driving mechanism), or 
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their access to local party/government mandates (if local mandate requirement is the 
driving mechanism), if not both.  
Given such local attachments, parties seeking minority votes may have an incentive 
to provide minority candidates with better list positions if they originate from areas with 
concentrations of minority voters. By allocating realistic list positions to local minority 
representatives, parties can signal to minority voters that it takes the issue of minority 
representation seriously. According to Krauss and colleagues (2012), local voters are 
aware of the list rankings that local candidates occupy in the PR tier of MM systems. 
Voters know ‘that a high ranking… is a signal that the candidate is favored by the party’ 
(p. 750) and influences ‘the likelihood that the candidate will be elected of the list tier’ 
(p. 751). In other words, parties’ nomination decisions in the closed-list PR tier affect 
how voters evaluate local candidates and their parties. Thus, it is rational for minority 
voters to cast a vote for the local minority candidate’s party list as it increases the 
likelihood that the minority candidate is elected off the list, and minority voters can 
simultaneously reward the party for providing for local descriptive representation. 
Anticipating this behaviour, party elites have then the opportunity to mobilise local 
minority voters by manipulating candidates’ list rankings. Indeed, as every additional 
vote has the potential to increase a party’s seat share under rules of proportional 
representation, parties’ vote-seeking incentives to consider locally concentrated voting 
groups should be high. 
This argumentation highlights the special role of local minority candidates for local 
minority mobilisation. Of course, in theory, the election of the candidate could simply 
be supported by voting for the party list regardless of whether the candidate is local or 
not. However, local candidates may be more visible to voters than other candidates on 
the list. As such, they could be utilised by their parties as important local campaigning 
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resources. As local candidates, they could mobilise the minority vote by canvassing 
ethnic community groups, knocking on doors of minority voters, meeting them face-to-
face in the pedestrian area or by giving interviews to local media. In accordance, 
Gschwend and Zittel (2015) argue that local candidates establish important voting cues 
in MM systems because they are in close proximity to the voter and actually appear on 
the ballot paper in MM systems. Moreover, after the election, parties could assign the 
task of constituency casework to the (then elected) minority legislator for the purpose of 
nurturing, if not extending, the local minority voting base. For these reasons, party elites 
who seek the minority vote may have an incentive to place minority candidates higher 
on their party lists, if these candidates are from local areas where minority groups 
concentrate.   
Thus, we hypothesise that minority candidates receive better list positions in the 
PR tier if they are from areas of high minority concentration.  
Case selection, data and variables 
To study empirically the relationship between minorities’ geographical concentrations 
and their descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems, we 
provide a case study of the 2013 German Bundestag elections focussing on the 
recruitment of immigrant-origin candidates in the PR tier. Germany’s long-standing 
history of immigration and the increasing ethnic diversity of the electorate, combined 
with a stark underrepresentation of immigrant-origin citizens in the Bundestag make 
Germany a very relevant case for the study of immigrant-minority representation. Due 
to its prototypical relevance, Germany’s MM proportional system is also widely 
considered a prime example for studying the consequences of MM systems for political 
representation (Manow, 2015: 1-8).  
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Voters can cast a candidate vote in a single-member district race (SMD tier) as well 
as a party vote for a closed list of candidates in 16 multi-seat districts (PR tier). The 
system is further compensatory in that the PR tier determines the number of 
parliamentary seats that parties ultimately receive. Moreover, like in most MM systems, 
dual candidacy is an important institutional feature of the system. All main parties 
decide party list nominations after nominations have been decided at the local level in 
order to ensure priority for constituency candidates to receive the best positions in the 
list, while remaining (mainly unwinnable) list slots are filled with list-only candidates 
(Manow, 2015: 161; Reiser, 2014: 59). In the 2013 Bundestag election, for example, out 
of a total of 332 elected candidates in the PR tier, 306, or 92%, were elected as dual 
candidates, while the percentage of successful candidates who ran only on a list 
amounted to only 8% of all PR tier legislators.  
Thus, the fact that almost all viable party list candidates are dual candidates 
provides us with the practical advantage of being able to link individual list candidates 
unambiguously to a specific local area. Consequently, we collected data on all 1138 
dual candidates running in the 2013 election for one of the five most relevant political 
parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, The Left, and Greens), omitting the selective groups of 
district only (n = 355) and list only candidates (n = 538) from the sample. However, the 
seemingly advantage of analysing only dual candidates’ list position has important 
consequences for disentangling the underlying assumed mechanisms. We explain this in 
greater detail in the discussion.  
The dataset was compiled with the help of Parlamentwatch e.V., a registered 
German charity (www.abgeordnetenwatch.de), which records detailed background 
information on all constituency candidates. The organisation kindly provided the 
respective data, which we complemented with official data from the Federal Electoral 
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Commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter, 2013) and sources described in the following 
paragraphs.  
Given that candidate selection predetermines candidates’ electoral prospects when 
closed party lists are in use (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 13), we focus on candidates’ list 
positions as a dependent variable. Thereby, it is instrumental to include successful as 
well as unsuccessful candidates in our analysis, because relying just on elected 
representatives (successful candidates) does not allow us to gain insights into the 
recruitment decisions taken before the election (Dancygier, 2014). To operationalize the 
dependent variable, we follow Hazan and Rahat, for whom a list position is viable if it 
can be considered ‘winnable before the elections… [such that] there is a need for a 
clear-cut and fixed delineation of the “realistic” from the “unrealistic”’ (Hazan and 
Rahat, 2010: 14).  
To capture parties’ assessment of how promising each list position is, we build on 
Hennl and Kaisers’ work on women’s representation in Germany. In their study, the 
authors incorporate a survey with the executive committees of the regional party 
associations asking for the criteria they use for estimating safe list positions. The 
responses suggest that parties rely mainly on survey data in combination with previous 
election results. Moreover, since the authors also asked for the exact number of 
estimated safe list positions, they find that the average of list mandates won in the 
previous and in the analysed election is a good indicator of parties’ anticipation of safe 
list positions (Hennl and Kaiser, 2008: 327). In line with this, we consider a candidates’ 
list position as promising if it is smaller or equal to the average of list mandates that the 
party won in the previous and in the analysed election. Nonetheless, the last promising 
list position is of course less promising than those high on the list, while the position 
just below the defined delineation line can be considered as better than the last position 
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on the entire list. We consider the significance of these differences by subtracting a 
candidate’s individual list position from the last promising position on a list, thus 
producing a continuous measure of candidates’ relative list positions. A value of ‘0’ 
denotes the last ‘promising’ position on a respective list, while positive (negative) 
values refer to positions above (below) the threshold, while also indicating each 
position’s numerical distance to the threshold. 
Following previous research on immigrant-minority representation in Germany 
(Donovan, 2007; Schönwälder, 2012; Wüst, 2014), we define and code candidates in 
our dataset as being of immigrant origin if they were born (a) outside the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s present territory with foreign nationality at birth; (b) in 
Germany but with foreign nationality at birth (first generation); or (c) with German 
nationality and at least one parent of foreign nationality at birth (second generation). For 
the actual coding of dual candidates’ immigrant backgrounds, we draw mainly on the 
information published by ‘Mediendienst Integration’ (Mediendienst Integration 2013) 
and other publicly available sources, such as personal websites, party websites, 
Wikipedia entries, and media interviews. In this way, we are able to identify 73 
candidates of immigrant-origin, which amounts to 6.4 % of all candidates in this dataset 
(captured in the dichotomous variable CIO).  
To measure the size of the immigrant-origin electorate at the constituency-level, we 
rely on the percentage of foreign nationals in the population (%FN). It ranges from 1 to 
28 percent, with an average of 9 percent. Obviously, this indicator can only approximate 
the immigrant-origin electorate, because foreign nationals, by definition, do not have 
the right to vote in national elections. Nevertheless, given that citizens of immigrant 
origin and foreign nationals tend to reside in the same neighbourhoods, %FN is a 
reasonable approximation of a constituency’s immigrant-origin electorate. Based on 
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census data at the level of administrative districts (Kreise), in 2013 the correlation 
between the two indicators was r=0.78 (Wüst 2014: 14). Moreover, another important 
limitation is that relying on this indicator does not allow us to distinguish between the 
population shares of different immigrant groups at the district-level. We return to this 
issue in the discussion.  
A set of control variables is supposed to account for variations influencing 
candidates’ relative list positions. At the level of regional multi-member districts, we 
control for district magnitude, accounting for the fact that party lists tend to be longer in 
districts of higher magnitude. At the party level, we include five dummy variables, one 
for each political party (CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, The Left, and FDP). At the 
constituency level, we include voter turnout as well as parties’ vote shares in the 
previous election (t-1) to control for the possibility that parties reward more politically 
active and supportive constituencies with a ‘list’ legislator in parliament (Manow, 2015: 
78).  
At the level of individual candidates, we also consider sociodemographic 
differences that may make candidates more attractive to party list selectors, including 
whether or not candidates are female and have a university degree (tertiary education) 
as well as candidates’ age to account for the possibility that party list selectors prefer 
candidates who are better educated or are in more advanced career stages (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1995: 113-15). Lastly, given that incumbency status is an important 
informal nomination rule in Germany (Reiser, 2014: 59), we also control for whether a 
candidate is a ‘list’ or ‘district’ incumbent or neither. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables described. Our dependent 
variable ranges from -50 to 18 with an average of -7, showing that most dual candidates 
do not occupy a promising list position. Overall, 304 out of 1138 dual candidates 
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occupy relative list positions greater or equal to zero, which seems a reasonable 
estimate when compared to the 306 dual candidates that were actually elected in the PR 
tier in 2013. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Min Max SD 
Relative list position 1138 -6.94 -50 18 11.29 
% FN 1138 9.10 1.01 28.37 5.48 
CIO 1138 0.06 0 1 0.25 
District magnitude 1138 36.53 4 74 22.93 
CDU/CSU 1138 0.21 0 1 0.41 
FDP 1138 0.23 0 1 0.42 
Greens 1138 0.19 0 1 0.39 
The Left 1138 0.12 0 1 0.33 
SPD 1138 0.25 0 1 0.43 
Voter turnout (t-1) 1138 71.52 58.93 79.79 3.88 
Party vote share (t-1) 1138 19.89 3.78 49.47 9.65 
Female 1138 0.34 0 1 0.47 
Age 1138 47.77 19 78 10.82 
Tertiary education 1121 0.79 0 1 0.41 
Not incumbent 1138 0.61 0 1 0.49 
List incumbent 1138 0.23 0 1 0.42 
SMD incumbent 1138 0.16 0 1 0.37 
Data analysis and results 
Using candidates’ relative list positions as a dependent variable allows us to compare 
candidates’ electoral prospects across party lists and multi-member districts. However, 
the empirical analysis must take into account that our operationalisation of relative list 
positions only constitutes a ‘limited’ measure (Long, 1997: 187) of candidates’ electoral 
prospects in the PR tier. To illustrate this point, consider the example of two candidates 
occupying relative list positions of, say, -50 and -40. Although the candidate occupying 
the latter position is ten positions higher up on the list, her chance of obtaining a seat in 
parliament is equally bad when compared to the other candidate (the likelihood of 
getting elected is close to 0% for both candidates)3, such that this difference in list 
positions should not be relevant to voters, candidates, or parties. It follows that the 
effect of minorities’ geographical concentration described in our article does not apply 
to differences in relative list positions below a certain list position threshold. For this 
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reason, it is instrumental to censor observations falling below this threshold when 
examining our dependent variable in a regression analysis (Long, 1997: 188). When the 
dependent variable is limited in this way, Tobit regression models produce more 
accurate parameter estimates than OLS models and, hence, are preferred (Long, 1997: 
189). Consequently, we employ Tobit models that left-censor the sample for relative list 
positions smaller than -20, thus censoring candidates who have less than a 3% chance of 
getting elected in the PR tier.4 Results presented do not vary greatly when changing the 
censoring threshold (see supplementary material). To take into account the clustering of 
the data inside multi-member districts, all regression coefficients are estimated with 
robust standard errors clustered on the 16 German Länder.  
Table 2 presents results of six Tobit models determining candidates’ relative list 
positions. The first model examines the impact of local immigrant shares, candidates’ 
immigrant backgrounds, and an interaction term5 of these variables on the dependent 
variable without considering the impact of the control variables. By including the 
interaction term, we intend to test whether dual candidates of immigrant-origin occupy 
relatively higher list positions in the German PR tier when they originate from areas 
with a higher local foreigner share or whether the two indicators are statistically 
unrelated to each other. 
The statistically significant positive effect of the interaction term suggests that a 
10% increase in local immigrant shares (about two standard deviations) improves the 
relative list placement of a candidate of immigrant origin by one position ((-0.15 + 0.26) 
* 10 = 1.1), while the insignificant effect of the constituent term (%FN) indicates that 
the local immigrant share has a slightly negative, nonsignificant effect on the relative 
list position of other candidates. The negative effect of the constituent term suggests 
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that for every immigrant-origin candidate who moves upward on the list, another 
candidate moves down, thus producing a small negative coefficient.  
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Table 2. Tobit regression models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables       
% FNa -0.15 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 -0.21 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) 
CIO 2.31 2.31 1.32 2.30 2.87* 1.81 
 (1.76) (1.61) (1.49) (1.59) (1.37) (1.12) 
CIO * % FN 0.26** 0.16* 0.23* 0.26** 0.24** 0.21* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Multi-member district 
level controls 
      
District magnitudea  -0.12***    -0.11*** 
  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Party-level controlsb       
FDP   -3.22*   -4.76* 
   (1.26)   (2.42) 
Grüne    0.39   -3.13 
   (1.35)   (1.70) 
Linke   4.39***   0.53 
   (0.84)   (1.26) 
SPD   2.12*   1.14 
   (1.05)   (1.60) 
Constituency-level 
controlsa 
      
Voter turnout (t-1)    0.01  0.13 
    (0.10)  (0.07) 
Party vote share (t-
1) 
   -0.00  -0.16*** 
    (0.05)  (0.03) 
Candidate-level 
controls 
      
Female candidate     3.31*** 2.49*** 
     (0.58) (0.49) 
Tertiary education     1.39* 1.79** 
     (0.58) (0.57) 
Agea     -0.02 -0.04* 
     (0.01) (0.02) 
C List incumbentc     11.46*** 11.46*** 
     (2.32) (2.34) 
C SMD incumbentc     4.55*** 5.06*** 
     (1.14) (1.32) 
Constant -6.42*** -6.54*** -6.78*** -6.42*** -11.96*** -10.65*** 
 (1.13) (0.47) (0.94) (1.11) (2.04) (1.17) 
Sigma 9.61*** 9.33*** 9.32*** 9.61*** 7.99*** 7.41*** 
 (1.56) (1.56) (1.50) (1.56) (1.12) (1.05) 
N 1138 1138 1138 1138 1121 1121 
Censored N 144 144 144 144 141 141 
Log-likelihood -3835.26 -3793.49 -3799.81 -3835.24 -3592.52 -3501.08 
Nagelkerke R2 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.30 0.40 
Note: Tobit regression models with left-censoring threshold at relative list position of -20. Table entries 
are unstandardised coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on 16 multi-member districts in 
parantheses. a Variables are centered at their global mean; b ‘CDU/CSU’ is the reference category; c ‘Not 
incumbent’ is the reference category; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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In Models 2 to 5, we add control variables depending on their level of measurement 
to the regression model. Most control variables work as expected and, as the models’ fit 
statistics reveal (indicated by higher values for Log-likelihood and Nagelkerkes’ R2), 
differences in district magnitude, party affiliations, and candidate-level characteristics 
feature strongest in the explanation of candidates’ relative list positions. Candidate-level 
variables have particularly strong explanatory power, mostly due to the incumbency 
variable, thus indicating that incumbent PR legislators are strongly advantaged on the 
list. Nevertheless, besides these influences, in all models the previously described effect 
of the interaction term remains robust, that is, indicating a statistically significant and 
positive effect of the local percentage of foreign nationals on the relative list placements 
of immigrant-origin candidates. Even in Model 6, where we add all control variables to 
the model, the relationship remains stable and the effect size substantial. Increasing the 
local percentage of foreign nationals in this model by 7 % (about one and a third 
standard deviations) improves the relative list placement of candidates of immigrant-
origin by one position ((-0.07 + 0.21) * 7 = 0.98).  
Further elaborations of our data suggest that the statistical association is mainly 
driven by the three parties on the political left (SPD, Greens, The Left). However, this 
does not come as a surprise given the well-known left-wing bias of immigrant-minority 
representation in Western European democracies (e.g. Bloemraad, 2013: 664). We 
provide additional empirical material and discussions on this issue in the supplementary 
material to this paper. Taken together, results do not change considerably, when model 
6 is replicated for left-wing parties only, because left-wing parties are a priori more 
likely to select immigrant-origin candidates in any case, and because the distribution of 
foreigner shares is strongly biased towards smaller values for the few immigrant-origin 
candidates who run for right-wing parties. 
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Figure 1. Marginal effects of CIO on relative list position depending on local share of 
foreign nationals with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Note: Based on Model 7 reported in Table 2. Remaining variables are hold at their means 
Figure 1 visualises the finding from Model 6 in a marginal effect plot showing how 
the effect of CIO on the realistic list position changes conditional on the local 
immigrant share (centred). The upward slope suggests that the impact of CIO on the 
dependent variable increases as the local share of foreign nationals increases. From the 
95% confidence intervals, it can be inferred that the positive effect of CIO becomes 
significant when the share of foreign nationals exceeds the average foreigner share by at 
least 2%. Taken together, these results indicate that the list positions of dual candidates 
of immigrant-origin are positively related to geographical concentrations of immigrant-
origin residents. Thus, we consider our hypothesis as confirmed. For robustness checks, 
please see the supplementary material.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we pursue the question of whether geographical patterns of minority 
representation exist in the PR tier of the German MM system. A review of previous 
research does not suggest the existence of a link between minorities’ geographical 
concentrations and their descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM 
systems. Subsequently, two arguments of why candidates may have, in many cases, 
local roots despite their nomination on a closed party list are proposed. First, party list 
candidates run in many MM systems simultaneously as SMD candidates due to 
contamination effects between the SMD and PR tier. Second, under formal closed-list 
PR electoral rules, candidates and legislators are often involved in local politics, for 
example as local councillors or party officials. Given these local attachments, party 
elites may have incentives to allocate better list positions to minority candidates who are 
rooted in areas of high minority density in order to attract the local minority vote. In line 
with this argumentation, the presented empirical evidence shows that dual candidates of 
immigrant-origin received better party list positions preceding the 2013 Bundestag 
elections when they were selected to run simultaneously as district candidates in local 
constituencies where many citizens of immigrant-origin reside.  
Despite this, our study has several limitations. First, a major concern is the 
unavailability of detailed district-level sociodemographic data. Due to the non-existence 
of such data, we have to rely on the local share of foreign nationals as a proxy for the 
immigrant-origin electorate in candidates’ home areas. However, in an ideal world, we 
would not only have a direct measure of our target group at the local level, but we 
would also be able to distinguish between the shares of different immigrant groups. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to do so because there is no district-level 
sociodemographic data available. For this reason, our analysis relies on the implicit 
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assumption that immigrant-origin voters prefer any immigrant-origin candidate over a 
native candidate, even if the immigrant-origin candidate has a different national 
background than the voter.  
Although this is not ideal, it can be argued that when minority voters are unable to 
select a representative with reliable descriptive characteristics, they nevertheless prefer 
pseudo-descriptive representatives, whose characteristics mimic descriptive 
representation (Mansbridge, 1999: 645). Such an understanding is also supported by 
empirical research on immigrants’ voting behaviour. This literature suggests that 
disadvantaged immigrant groups tend to see their own social and economic 
disadvantages as linked to the disadvantages of immigrants more generally (Sanders et 
al., 2014). For this reason, most immigrant voters tend to vote for immigrant-origin 
candidates, irrespective of whether the candidate has a matching or different national 
background, because voters perceive immigrant-origin candidates to be more 
trustworthy than native candidates in representing the interests of immigrant groups 
(Bergh and Bjorklund, 2011; Teney et al., 2010; Zingher and Farrer, 2016). In addition, 
it can be argued that relying on the foreigner share should make for a tough test of our 
hypothesised link as it should bias the coefficient of the interaction term downward in 
case there was no voting link between voters and candidates of different immigrant 
origin.  
Second, as the German MM system operates in a PR tier with several multi-
member districts, the composition of party lists may be targeted to the regional 
sociodemographic profile. This relationship might feed into the link between minorities’ 
local concentration and their descriptive representation. In other words, it is possible 
that list positions of immigrant-origin candidates are to some extent affected by the 
minority population shares of multi-member districts. Although this potential effect is 
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accounted for in our empirical models through the consideration of robust standard 
errors clustered at the level of regions (multi-member districts), the question remains 
whether our finding is specific to the German system or whether it applies also to MM 
systems operating in national PR tiers. Although we cannot answer this question, it can 
be argued that minor changes in MM electoral system design have occurred in MM 
systems in the past and may happen in the future; for example changing from a national 
to a regionally differentiated PR tier, or vice versa. Therefore, even if our finding is 
specific to the German-style system, electoral system reformers may want to consider it 
when evaluating potential changes to the territorial organisation of the PR tier of MM 
systems. 
A third limitation is that our single-country study does not allow us to distinguish 
the consequences of contamination-induced dual candidacy requirements from 
consequences of candidates’ other involvements in local politics. Unfortunately, 
including a control group of list-only candidates as a means to separate these effects is 
not feasible. List-only candidates are a priori very unlikely to receive a promising list 
position; therefore, they are too selective a group to be compared to dual candidates in 
Germany.  
Although our study leaves open a number of questions, it makes a major 
contribution to the study of electoral systems and minority representation as it is the 
first to shed light on the link between minorities’ local concentration and their 
descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems. As such, it makes 
plausible arguments for why this link should be there and provides first empirical 
evidence from a country that is particularly relevant with regard to immigrant-minority 
representation. Thus, the present contribution is an important reference point for future 
studies of minorities’ descriptive representation in MM and closed-list PR systems. A 
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crucial point is the possibility of geographical representation in the PR tier as a 
consequence of contamination effects. In fact, confirmation of contaminated minority 
representation flowing from the SMD to the PR tier would have important implications 
for previous scholarship conducted in MM systems. This line of research relies 
exclusively on the assumption of independent electoral tiers. In this regard, although our 
article cannot ultimately prove contamination effects, at least it casts doubts regarding 
the validity of the assumption of independence. Thus, we urge future researchers to 
keep in mind that it is not necessarily appropriate to assume independent electoral tiers 
when studying minorities’ descriptive representation in MM systems. This article 
narrows crucial gaps in previous scholarship on minority representation in MM and 
closed-list PR systems, while outlining avenues for future research.  
To test the generalisability of the finding, future studies should examine the extent 
to which it travels to other MM as well as to ‘pure’ closed-list PR systems. First, future 
research may develop and test hypotheses regarding the consequences of different 
institutional variations within the broader category of MM systems. Although the 
German system is widely recognised to be the prototype MM system, guiding 
implementation in other countries (Manow, 2015: 1-8), these systems do not resemble 
the German one in every detail. We already noted that other systems might operate in a 
nationwide rather than in several regional multi-member districts. MM systems can also 
differ in other aspects, for example as to whether the PR tier is compensatory or not, 
and as to whether dual candidacy6 is allowed or not (Krauss et al., 2012; Shugart and 
Wattenberg, 2003). While we would not necessarily expect patterns of minorities’ 
geographical representation in the PR tier to differ depending on such different MM 
system designs, only future empirical scrutiny will determine if the found geographical 
representation link also exists in these.  
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Second, we need research on minorities’ geographical representation in ‘pure’ 
closed-list PR systems as well as comparisons of this type of system with MM systems. 
Indeed, geographical patterns of minority representation may not be limited to the PR 
component of MM systems. Since candidates’ involvement in local politics is a 
common feature of many ‘pure’ closed-list PR systems, similar effects may be found 
here. Moreover, by comparing MM with ‘pure’ closed-list PR systems, future research 
should be better able to disentangle effects of contamination from effects of candidates’ 
local involvement that generally apply to closed-list PR electoral systems. Based on 
such a comparative research design, the contamination thesis would find strong 
corroboration if minorities’ geographical representation is found to be a more decisive 
feature in mixed than in ‘pure’ systems. A finding of similar patterns of geographical 
representation in both types of systems would, on the other hand, strengthen the thesis 
that such representational patterns can be a feature of any closed-list system. 
However, new databases are needed to allow the tracing of minority representation 
across different electoral systems and, ideally, even further down the ‘ladder of 
recruitment’ by incorporating the aspirants applying for candidacy in the analysis. 
Future research should build such databases and investigate whether, how, and which 
institutions of local representation matter to minorities’ descriptive representation across 
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1 Throughout this paper, the terms ‘minority’ and ‘ethnic minority’ are used interchangeably. 
Following previous research (Bochsler, 2010; Moser, 2008, p. 280; Ruedin, 2009), ethnic 
minority groups are in a numerical minority position and members of these groups self identify 
with each other due to common religion, language, cultural history, race, or national identity. 
Thus, the definition applies to minority groups with a long-standing history of residence in a 
country (autochthonous) as well as to immigrant minorities (allochthonous). 
2 Dual candidacy exists in many MM systems, among them Hungary, Italy (before 2005), Japan 
(lower chamber), Lithuania, New Zealand, Scotland, Wales (since 2016) and the German 
regional parliaments (see Crisp, 2007: 1462; Ferrara et al., 2005: 18; Hennl, 2014: 94; Krauss et 
al., 2012: 754). Exceptions extend to Japan (upper chamber), Thailand, Ukraine and Wales 
(before 2016). 
3 To illustrate this point statistically, we fit a bivariate probit regression model estimating the 
effect of relative list positions on the likelihood of getting elected off a party list in 2013 (see 
Table A1 in the supplementary material) and also visualised the relationship in a marginal 
effects plot (Figure A1 in the supplementary material). The graph shows a distinct ‘floor effect’ 
of our dependent variable: In other words, the relative list position between the lowest observed 
value of -50 and approximately -20 has literally no positive effect on a candidate’s electoral 
prospects, while increasing the relative list positions between values of approximately -20 and 
18 translates continuously into better electoral prospects. 
4 This election likelihood follows from the probit regression estimation shown in Table and 
Figure A1. 
5 The centring of %FN at its mean value is supposed to handle multicollinearity between the 





6 In order to examine whether the dual candidacy provision is prerequisite for contamination-
induced geographical representation in MM systems, future research may turn to cases that do 
not allow for dual candidacy. For example, it may be possible to study how the implementation 
of dual candidacy in Wales in 2016 influenced minority representation as compared to previous 
elections. Alternatively, future research may compare minority representation in Wales (before 
2016) and Scotland, a MM system that allows dual candidacy. As both systems are subnational 
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